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ABSTRACT
We examine the extent of needless traffic exposure by the
routing infrastructure to nations geographically irrelevant
to packet transmission. We quantify what countries are geo-
graphically logical to observe on a network path traveling
between two nations through the use of convex hulls circum-
scribing major population centers. We then compare that
to the nation states observed in over 2.5 billion measured
paths. We examine both the entire geographic topology of
the Internet and a subset of the topology that a Tor user
would typically interact with. We reveal that 44% of paths
concerning the entire geographic topology of the Internet
and 33% of paths in the user experience subset unnecessarily
expose traffic to at least one nation, but often more. Finally,
we consider the scenario where countries exercise both legal
and physical control over autonomous systems, gaining ac-
cess to traffic outside of their geographic borders, but carried
by organizations that fall under the AS’s registered country’s
legal jurisdiction. At least 49% of paths in both measurements
expose traffic to a geographically irrelevant country when
considering both the physical and legal countries that a path
traverses.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet is comprised of independent networks called
Autonomous Systems (ASes) which depend on each other for
inter-network connectivity. Network traffic often traverses
multiple ASes in order to reach its final destination. Any
adversarial transit AS situated between sender and receiver,
termed a path based adversary, can degrade network avail-
ability, violate data integrity, and undermine confidentiality.
While a single malicious transit AS is a powerful adversary,
nation states represent an even stronger path based adver-
sary. A nation state has the ability to exercise control over
both ASes that physically operate networking infrastructure
within its borders and ASes whose corporate governance
falls within the nation state’s legal jurisdiction. A motivated
nation state could coerce multiple ASes into acting as collud-
ing path based adversaries on the nation state’s behalf.
∗Jordan completed this work while at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
Revelations in recent years have demonstrated the ex-
tent to which nation states are willing to exert pressure
on private entities in an effort to execute national cyber
policy on network traffic. For example, the United States,
Great Britain, and other members of the so called Five Eyes
intelligence alliance have integrated dragnet surveillance
into core Internet transit links that reside within their bor-
ders [1, 11, 35]. Additionally, there exist recorded instances
of censoring nation states applying domestic censorship poli-
cies to network traffic that neither originates nor is bound
for domestic sources [17, 36].
Due to the potential security concerns exposure to addi-
tional nation states might present, it is reasonable to expect
that the Internet’s routing infrastructure minimizes such ex-
posures. In scenarios where sender and receiver reside inside
the same or adjacent nation states, one would expect that
these are the only jurisdictions traffic is exposed to. Even
in scenarios where the sender and receiver are located in
non-adjacent nations, and exposure to third party nation
states is a physical necessity, one might assume that expo-
sure is limited to a minimal set of nations required to build a
physical link between sender and receiver. However, rout-
ing decisions focus on the logical network topology rather
than the geographic or political topology. This can result in
paths exposing traffic to nations which do not lie between
the geographic locations of the sender and receiver. This
excess exposure needlessly increases the power of certain
nation states if they elected to coerce ASes into serving as
path-based (i.e. on-path) adversaries on their behalf.
In this work, we examine to what extent the Internet’s
routing infrastructure increases the capacity of certain nation
states to undermine security properties of network traffic in
excess of what would be predicted. Specifically, we quantify
how often network traffic is exposed to additional nation
states beyond those residing along a geographically logical
path between sender and receiver. Building the set of geo-
graphically logical countries between sender and receiver
is done with a novel technique based on computing a popu-
lation biased convex hull between the sending country and
receiving country. We define the set of geographically normal
countries providing transit between source and destination
to be the set of all countries that lie at least partially in this
convex hull. We examine two populations of paths in this
work. First, we examine a sample of the entire topology of
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the Internet, which we term all-to-all. Second, we examine
a subset of paths to the Alexa Top 1000 [3] through the
Tor browser, which we call our user experience dataset. To
explore the physical exposure of data to nation states we com-
pare the countries where network infrastructure observed
on the paths is physically located to the set of geographically
normal countries we would expect. We also explore what
happens when nation states, in addition to taking advantage
of physical exposure, exercise control over ASes whose cor-
porate governance operates within their legal jurisdiction,
and leverage that pressure to observe all data handled by
such ASes, which we term legal exposure.
All together, we examine over 2.5 billion paths from
traceroutes conducted by CAIDA’s Ark measurement frame-
work [2] and the RIPE Atlas measurement framework [7].
Overall, we find that 44% of examined all-to-all paths and
37% of the examined user experience paths physically ex-
pose traffic to at least one unexpected nation state. Further-
more, we find that the quality of paths varies greatly on a
country-to-country basis. As an example, more than half of
the countries observed saw unexpected nation states on 80%
or more of their inbound paths. Lastly, when we consider
the countries that paths both legally and physically traverse,
at least 49% of paths in both datasets expose traffic to at least
one unexpected nation state.
The remainder of this paper is presented as follows. In
Section 2 we will cover relevant background on how logical
routing decisions are made, and expand on the motivation
for our study. In Section 3 we will present our methodology
for collecting paths, labeling countries that the path either
physically or legally exposes data to, and lastly how we build
a quantifiable measure of what countries are geographically
logical to observe between source and destination. In Sec-
tion 3.5 we will cover the properties of our resultant datasets.
Section 4 examines the extent to which nations physically
expose their traffic to other countries, along with how often
that exposure is geographically illogical. Section 5 expands
this analysis to additionally consider exposure to entities that
could be legally coerced by a particular country. Section 6
compares our work to similar studies. Lastly we draw our
final conclusions in Section 7.
2 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
2.1 Path Selection On the Internet
The Internet is comprised of a collection of independently
administered networks called Autonomous Systems, or ASes.
ASes provide network connectivity to hosts inside of their
network, enabling those hosts to connect to other host lo-
cated either inside the same AS or in a remote AS. To this
end, ASes deploy special purpose networking equipment
called routers, whose job it is to compute the best path be-
tween data sender and receiver, and forward data to the next
hop (router) in that path. In order to compute best paths,
routers execute routing protocols, which facilitate the ex-
change of topology information between routers using that
information to compute best paths. Routing protocols do not
compute the best path to every individual IP address, rather,
routing protocols compute best paths to blocks of IP address,
and forward traffic addressed to any host inside that block
along the same path. Routing protocols are typically divided
into two categories, inter-AS and intra-AS routing protocols.
Inter-AS routing protocols compute the sequence of ASes
data will travel when moving between remote ASes. Intra-AS
routing protocols compute the best path traffic takes inside
a given AS. Intra-AS routing protocols are responsible for
both getting traffic to a end destination inside the current AS
and delivering traffic to a boarder router that will transfer
traffic to the next AS along a multi-AS path.
The Border Gateway Protocol [29], or BGP, is the de-facto
standard inter-AS routing protocol. The single standard rout-
ing protocol is a result of the demand for interoperability
between independently managed organizations that often
compete with each other. BGP is a path vector routing proto-
col with policies. The policy portion of BGP allows network
administrators to select paths based on arbitrary criteria,
rather than simple the shortest paths. Commonly, ASes uti-
lize their business relationship with neighboring ASes to
make a first pass routing decision. ASes that have direct con-
nectivity with each other typically form customer-provider
relationships, where the customer pays the provider for all
traffic flowing between the two ASes in exchange for connec-
tivity to remote ASes via the provider. ASes will generally
follow a routing policy termed “Valley Free Routing”, where
they prefer routes that are more economically advantageous,
however recent measurement studies have shown that this
is not always the case [12].
Because intra-AS decisions only need to be computed over
infrastructure held by one organization, removing the de-
mand for interoperability, there are a myriad of intra-AS
routing protocols deployed. Examples include link state pro-
tocols such as IS-IS [28] and OSPF [26], along with path
vector variants such as EIGRP [32]. Most intra-AS protocols
include the ability to include network policy rather than sim-
ple network distance as part of the routing decision making
process. This policy is often expressed as an “administrative
distance” giving the algorithm hints as to the administrator’s
preferences.
2.2 Measuring Utilized Paths
Predicting the exact path data will travel between source
and destination is challenging. In the case of inter-domain
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routing, AS relationships are closely held secrets. These re-
lationships can be inferred with some degree of accuracy
based on publicly available BGP mirrors, sources of infor-
mation on the current state of the BGP global routing table.
However, as shown most recently by Anwar et. al. [12], us-
ing inferred relationships to predict inter-AS routing paths
can be inaccurate. Predicting intra-AS routes is even more
challenging. First, which intra-AS routing protocol an AS is
using is a corporate secret, and difficult to detect. Second, the
particular configuration and administrative preferences that
factor into the intra-AS routing protocol’s decision making
process are difficult to both infer and to use as a predictive
model accurately.
An alternative, but more accurate, method for determining
the utilized path between hosts is to execute a traceroute [25]
between the two hosts. Traceroute takes advantage of how
networking equipment commonly behaves when it encoun-
ters a packet with an expired Time-To-Live (TTL) field. Often,
but not always, routers will respond with an ICMP message
to the sending host, informing the host that the packet ex-
pired, and the IP address at which the packet expired. By
sending packets with small, but incrementally increasing,
TTLs, and recording the IP addresses that respond, a host can
map the sequence of routers a packet traverses on its path.
While traceroute provides a high level of accuracy, there
are several shortcomings. Most obviously, the source must
be under the control of the measuring party. To overcome
this shortcoming, there are several distributed measurement
test-beds that either conduct traceroutes at regular intervals
to large portions of the Internet or conduct traceroutes to
specified hosts. Examples of such test-beds include CAIDA’s
Ark Infrastructure [2] and RIPE’s Atlas Infrastructure [7].
Another major issue with traceroute is that network infras-
tructure is not obligated to respond when a packet’s TTL
expires. In this case gaps in the full path to the host will
result.
2.3 Path Based Adversaries
The security properties of many distributed systems can be
impacted by the adversarial AS that transits data, what we re-
fer to as a path based adversary. As an example, a path based
adversary can trivially violate the confidentiality of any un-
encrypted traffic. Despite this obvious threat vector, a recent
study by the EFF found that only about half of web traffic
is actually encrypted [19]. More complex attacks undermin-
ing confidentially are also possible. Consider an AS that
wishes to attempt to de-anonymize users of Tor, an anony-
mous communication system. Feamster and Dingledine [18]
showed that a path based adversary AS could undermine the
anonymity properties of the Tor network when when the
AS appears on a path between a user and their entry into
the Tor network, as well as appearing between their traffic’s
exit point from the Tor network and its final destination. The
integrity of distributed systems can also be disrupted by ad-
versaries who lie along a utilized path. Apostolaki et. al. [13]
demonstrated that adversaries capable of observing traffic
between 900 IP blocks could control and edit interactions
between a majority of the computational power dedicated to
mining Bitcoin, opening up the possibility of double spend-
ing via forced forking of the blockchain. Additionally, in 2014
attackers utilized compromised BGP speakers in an effort
to hijack communications between Bitcoin miners and their
pool servers [21], resulting in the theft of Bitcoins.
There exist both academic studies and real world exam-
ples of adversaries that can control multiple ASes, becoming
exceptionally wide reaching path based adversaries. Johnson
et. al. [22] first expanded the AS level Tor adversarial model
to include such powerful adversaries when they explored the
capacity of Internet Exchange Points to de-anonymize Tor
users. Revelations from whistle blowers including both the
Snowden leaks [1] and earlier revelations by the AT&T con-
tractor Mark Klein [11, 35] demonstrated the willingness of
the NSA and other spy agencies such as GCHQ to integrate
surveillance devices, and even systems which actively inject
data into network streams, inside core network infrastruc-
ture located within their respective nations. In addition to the
attacks outlined above, documents have revealed a complex
infrastructure for violating user confidentiality by building
relationship graphs based solely on linking data senders and
receivers. Furthermore, there exists evidence of censoring
nation states, for example China, either accidentally or inten-
tionally applying censorship policies to traffic that neither
originates in nor is bound to domestic hosts [17, 36].
2.4 Motivation
From a security perspective, exposing traffic to any unnec-
essary nation is potentially problematic since it grants the
opportunity for those nations to act as path based adversaries.
Examples of potential malicious activity includes more than
the aforementioned areas of recent work. More broadly, it
includes dropping the data, eavesdropping on the data, and
even changing the contents of the data, thus removing any
expectation of data integrity.While exposure to some nations
is unavoidable, any traffic exposed to extraneous nations, i.e.
nations not physically necessary for the propagation of traf-
fic, needlessly increases the aforementioned security risks.
Our goal in this paper is to algorithmically measure the frac-
tion of paths that expose network traffic to nations that are
geographically illogical, and to quantify how much extrane-
ous traffic a nation state gets to observe and control from
these geographically illogical paths. Geographically illogical
paths occur both under physical and legal conditions.
There are two scenarios in which data can fall under the
legal jurisdiction of a nation. The first, scenario is when the
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data is handled by networking equipment physically located
in the borders of a nation during transit. The second, less
obvious scenario, is when data "legally" transits a nation. In
this scenario a nation may have legal jurisdiction of data
that does not physically transit a country due to an AS be-
ing legally registered in one nation while having physical
infrastructure in another. This scenario is of particular in-
terest as of late with the passing of the CLOUD Act in the
United States stating that the United States may, in some
scenarios, have access to data that is physically stored in
other countries but under legal jurisdiction of the United
States [15]. This legal vs. physical router presence motivates
our work beyond purely adversarial tampering, particularly
from a policy perspective. The ideal geographic situation for
data traveling from nation A to nation B is a path that con-
sistently moves towards nation B. In other words, we would
logically expect the geographic network level paths between
two nations to approximately, but not exactly, traverse the
shortest path between those nations. While this definition
is simplistic, it does highlight certain path selection choices
that are illogical from a geographic standpoint. For example,
a path that goes the opposite direction that its destination
should be considered illogical. Additionally, data with a des-
tination that lies within the same nation it originated from
should almost never leave that nation.
3 EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
In order to quantify the amount of geographically illogical
paths and which countries can exert additional control over
network traffic we need to build two datasets. First, we must
establish a set of countries that we would expect traffic to
be logically exposed to during transit between a particular
source/destination pair based on geographic realities. We
term countries inside of this set geographically normal for
a given source and destination. Second, we must establish
the actual paths data takes from sources to destinations and
establish which countries the network traffic is exposed to.
We compute both which countries physically host the net-
work infrastructure traveled, termed physical exposure, and
which countries can exert legal pressure on the ASes ap-
pearing along the path, termed legal exposure. By comparing
the set of countries a path exposes network traffic to with
the set of geographically normal countries, we can label the
path as either normal, no excess exposure, or non-normal,
containing geographically illogical countries. We can also
quantify the number of times a country is a benefactor of a
non-normal path: specifically the number of additional paths
it can observe as the result of geographically irregular paths.
3.1 Geographically Logical Paths
Defining the geographically normal countries for a source
and destination pair was done using a novel technique based
on convex hulls. The convex hull of a set of points S in n
dimensions is the intersection of all convex sets containing
s . For n points p1, ...,pN the convex hull C is then given by
the expression:
C =
N∑
j=1
λjρ j : λj ≥ 0 ∀j and
N∑
j=1
λj = 1 (1)
A more intuitive way to think about the definition of a con-
vex hull: given a set of points, imagine the shape a stretched
rubber band takes when encompassing all of them.
Using Equation 1, we can build convex hulls containing
both the set of points that define the country containing the
source and a set of points that define the country containing
the destination. These convex hulls are computed taking
the spherical nature of the Earth into account. Note that
when a country is the source and destination of network
traffic, we only consider that country as normal and do not
build a convex hull for the single country. This convex hull
construction efficiently defines all points that lie between
source and destination countries. Source and destination
were considered at the granularity of nation states tomitigate
limitations in the accuracy of GeoIP location usage later. It
should be noted that this coarser granularity only increases
the number of countries considered geographically normal,
thus providing an estimate of geographically normal that
tends towards logical over illogical. We then compute the set
of geographically normal countries by finding all countries
that either fully or partially fall within this convex hull. In
order to detect countries that reside inside the convex hull,
we test if any of the 15 largest cities in the given country
resides inside the convex hull. To detect countries that lie
only partially inside of the convex hull, we test if any point
along the edge of the convex hull lies inside the borders of
a particular country. We consider the entire country to be
geographically normal if any of the 15 largest cities inside of
a country or the border of a country lies within the defined
convex hull.
One option for defining the set of points that make up a
country is to utilize the nation’s political borders, provided in
the Matic shapefile dataset [6]. In order to test this approach,
we utilized shapefiles which contain points that define poly-
gons of the actual borders of each country. This approach
tends to result in convex hulls between two nations that
contain countries which do not lie in the path between those
nations. One factor contributing to this is countries with
non-contiguous territories or remote territorial holdings. An
example of this is the United State’s convex hull when includ-
ing Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and other remote
territories, as the resulting convex hull covered roughly one
quarter of the earth’s total surface area. Additionally, the po-
litical borders of a country do not necessarily reflect where
bulk the Internet infrastructure of the country is located;
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Figure 1: A comparison of the border based convex hull and
population biased convex hull betweenChina andMongolia.
Note that over 83% of China’s population lives on its eastern
coast.
as this generally lies in the more populated areas. Relevant
examples of this include China and Russia. To address, this
we built a separate definition of points describing a country
using the latitude and longitude of the top 15 most populous
cities in that country [4].
Figure 1 shows an example of the two construction tech-
niques for a selected path between China and Mongolia. The
population-based convex hull results in a stricter version of
geographically normal between two countries and accurately
reflects the fact that 83% of China’s population, including
all of its major cities, reside in the eastern portion of the
country. The border based convex hull includes countries in
the wrong cardinal direction, such as India and Vietnam, a
result of China’s concave shape. We chose to use the city or
population based construction of a convex hull for the mea-
surements contained inside this work. When a country is
both the source and destination of traffic we consider traffic
not normal if any other country is found on the path from
source to destination.
3.2 Building Path Datasets
Our goal is to measure the physical and legal exposure of
paths on the Internet. Ultimately, we do this from two per-
spectives: an all-to-all perspective and a user experience
perspective. In measuring the exposure of paths from an all-
to-all perspective, we attempt to gain insight into the entire
geographic topology of the Internet. We realize, however,
that many users only interact with a subset of the entire
topology due to content being cached at CDNs that are geo-
graphically local to the end user. Therefore, it is important to
separate and compare these two perspectives to understand
the similarities and differences between the geographic topol-
ogy that a user sees and what is actually available. We take
advantage of two commonly used traceroute frameworks to
obtain a statistically significant sample size for each perspec-
tive.
3.2.1 All-To-All Path Set. First, we leverage CAIDAsArchi-
pelago Measurement Infrastructure (ARK) [2]. ARK allows
us to measure the entire geographic topology of the Internet.
Comprised of over 180 monitors, ARK coordinators monitors
which work in teams to send traceroutes to a random IP ad-
dress in each block of globally addressable IPs 1 Note that this
does not imply that each monitor probes every announced
prefix every 48 hours, but that a single destination prefix will
be probed by one monitor each cycle. There are two impor-
tant features that make this measurement system the best
for measuring the geographic topology of the Internet as a
whole. First, it provides a uniform sample across the set of
possible destinations by probing each announced /24 prefix.
Second, it gives us both a geographically and legally diverse
monitor set to probe from. The ARK measurement system
has probes in over 160 ASNs and 64 unique countries. Figure
2 shows CAIDA monitors located on every major continent.
3.2.2 User Experience Path Set. The majority of (source,
destination) pairs on the Internet are not selected in an "all-to-
all" fashion. Users typically access content cached in Content
Distribution Networks, or CDNs [24]. CDNs replicate con-
tent, storing content on several servers scattered across the
Internet. When users attempt to access content stored in
a CDN, they are typically directed to the CDN server that
is closest to them in terms of the network topology. This
has two impacts on the paths user data typically travels over.
First, in general we expect paths from users to the CDN nodes
serving them to be shorter than the average path length on
the Internet, due to the emphasis on content locality. Second,
two users accessing the same piece of content might fetch
it from different servers, depending on where the users are
located. In order to build an accurate model of paths users
take to popular content, we need to establish what servers
users in a particular network connect to when accessing web
content and what the path that specific user would take to
those servers.
We visited the Alexa Top 1000 [3] from a collection of
geographically distributed vantage points to measure what
IP addresses are accessed when users load popular web con-
tent. We then recorded the remote hosts connected to in the
process of fetching the content. Websites were loaded using
a full version of the Chrome browser, driven by automation
provided by the Selenium [8] framework. It is vital that web-
sites be fetched using a full browser, rather than simply using
DNS resolution of the domain or wget, as a large fraction of
the content on websites is loaded only when the CSS and
Javascript on a page are processed by a browser rendering
engine. The page loads are repeated from a geographically
diverse collection of locations because the location a server’s
1Specifically, each announced /24 prefix.
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content is fetched from for a particular user vary based on
the user’s location, recall the note on CDN locality.
Page loads were conducted through the Tor Network [14],
an anonymous communication tool, which has open proxies
scattered around the globe. We use Tor because one of our
primary motivations is to understand how users could be
affected by censorship from Geographically-Illogical paths.
Since Tor is the de facto Censorship-resistant browser, we
chose this as our HTTP proxy for Selenium. All DNS res-
olutions during this data gathering phase were conducted
through available public Tor proxies to ensure that our crawler
was pointed to the resources that were appropriate for the
location of the Tor proxy. To ensure that the Tor browser
was not hitting CAPTCA pages and in fact loading all home-
page content, we conducted an analysis of the page content
through Tor. We found when using a standard web frame-
work analysis tool, Wappalyzer [10], that only 34 of the top
1000 sites contained reCAPTCHA scripts on their homepages.
While these reCAPTCHA versions may not have blocked the
content in our measurement, we point out that this content
was only detected in 3.4% of the top 1000 pages.
We take advantage of the RIPE Atlas [7] measurement
ecosystem tomeasure the path a user’s communicationwould
travel to and from these servers. RIPE Atlas allows network
operators to conduct measurements to user defined IP ad-
dresses from a set of geographically distributed probes. Dur-
ing our crawling of the Alexa Top 1000, we only selected Tor
proxies that were located in the same AS/country pair as at
least one RIPE Atlas node. For each crawl of the Alexa Top
1000, we conducted traceroutes from the RIPE Atlas probes
to all IP addresses observed during page loads conducted
from that particular AS/country pair. This set of traceroutes
is our "User Experience" dataset.
3.3 Computing Exposure
The datasets built in the prior section provide us two collec-
tions of traceroutes representative of particular populations
of paths found on the Internet. We must map each IP ad-
dress found in these paths to the countries that the data is
physically and legally exposed to during transit in order to
establish if these paths expose traffic to extraneous countries.
3.3.1 Computing Physical Exposure. Computing physical
exposure of a traceroute involves mapping each IP address
in the traceroute back to the country it is physically located
in. We must use one of many IP geolocation services that
exist to solve this problem. There are multiple issues with
these services. First, many are not free, or free at scale, so any
IP queries to them must be carefully spent. Second, while
the services are historically good at geolocating end hosts
(at a country granularity), they have been known to be less
precise when attempting to geolocate routers [20]. We chose
Figure 2: CAIDA’s monitor locations make it
ideal for measuring the all-to-all geographic
topology of the Internet.
Figure 3: Our selected RIPE Atlas probe/Tor
proxy pairs cover every continent like
CAIDA, though less countries are repre-
sented.
to use NetAcuity to geolocate our IP addresses, as research
has recently shown them to be best at geolocating routers [9].
We do not consider the goelocation of any IP address at a
resolution finer than the country level to limit the effects of
IP geolocation on our results.
3.3.2 Computing Legal Exposure. Computing the legal
exposure of a tracreoute is a more exact science. We map
each IP address in the path back to the AS who owns the IP
address by consulting snapshots of BGP routing tables from
RouteViews [31]. More specifically, we determine the AS
who owns an IP address by examining who originated the
path for the block of the IP addresses on the day the traceroute
was conducted. We then map the AS to its legal jurisdiction
with country data from the IANA registry [5].
3.4 Common Processing Pipeline
We built a common pipeline to process each traceroute from
the all-to-all and user experience datasets using the informa-
tion gathered from Section 3.3. Due to the monetary cost of
geolocating IP addresses, we have carefully chosen how we
have spent our queries to NetAcuity. Specifically, we geolo-
cate every router found in the CAIDA traceroutes. Note that
this does not mean we have geolocated every router on the
Internet, but only the ones seen in the CAIDA traceroutes.
Furthermore, we have geolocated every IP address found in
6
Figure 4: The process of transforming and formulating a
traceroute based on its geographically (il)logical state.
the RIPE Atlas traceroutes. Due to CAIDAs measurement
process and the monetary costs of geolocating large amounts
of IP addresses, we were not able to geolocate every destina-
tion where CAIDA targeted a traceroute. Instead, we have
geolocated a single IP address in every /26 we saw a tracer-
oute to in CAIDAs measurements. This allows us to lookup
IP addresses we do not have specific geolocation for using a
longest matching prefix structure.
Processing a traceroute, visualized in Figure 4, involves
converting an IP level path into an aggregate path of (mapped
country, AS tuples). When building this new path, we do not
add any hops from the original traceroute measurement
where we do not know the AS or country that the IP address
belongs to, nor do we include hops which do not respond
with an ICMP message to the traceroute. This implies that
our measurements and resulting analysis are a lower bound
on the countries and ASes that the path exposes traffic to. This
is critical to understanding that the raw exposure we will
soon present could potentially be worse in practice. Next, We
compress repeated instances of the same tuple down to a sin-
gle instance. Finally, we label paths as either geographically
normal or “non-normal” based on sets of expected countries
to appear on the path constructed in Section 3.1.
3.5 Dataset Overview
Table 1: An overview of our measurement results.
Measurement Framework CAIDA RIPE Atlas
Measurement Goal All-To-All Topology User Experience
# of Vantage Points 174 76
# of ASes with Vantage Point(s) 148 76
# of Countries with Vantage Point(s) 52 30
# of Destination Countries Seen 240 64
# of Paths Examined 2,513,603,233 81,288
Global Physical DoN 0.565 0.632
Global Legal DoN 0.712 0.675
All together, we examined over 2.5 billion paths from both
a physical and legal standpoint using our convex-hull defi-
nitions of normal. The examined CAIDA traceroutes were
conducted between the dates January 1, 2018 and May 1,
2018. The examined RIPE Atlas traceroutes were conducted
in February and March of 2018. We start our examination
Figure 5: CAIDA’s measurement structure
gives us uniform access to destinations,
which we see above.
Figure 6: We see destinations on all major
populated continents in the user study con-
ducted via RIPE Atlas, but not all countries.
by looking at a general overview of the number and type
of results we have obtained. Table 1 gives a brief overview
of the quantity and type of measurements conducted. We
see immediately that we have an incredibly large number of
paths for our all-to-all topology measurement and a lesser
number of paths for our user experience topology measure-
ment. This is simply due to the nature of the measurement
systems: CAIDA provides free traceroutes for us to use while
the RIPE Atlas "on demand" systemmeans we have to choose
traceroutes wisely based on credits available and responsive
probes.
CAIDA’s measurement infrastructure conducts a tracer-
oute to every announced /24 on the Internet, meaning we
expect to see every country represented on this list, as there
is some amount of Internet infrastructure in every nation.
On the other hand, our measurements from RIPE Atlas were
specifically to Alexa Top 1000 websites, which are expected
to be hosted closer to the majority of end users via CDNs,
resulting in a concentration of these destinations in nations
with more Internet users. Figure 6 shows that we still see des-
tinations on every major continent in the RIPE measurement
data, but not every country.
On average, we see that paths to CDNs are slightly shorter
in terms of AS/country pairs than paths in our all-to-all
dataset, as seen in Figure 7. This trend is slightly less as-
sertive in Figure 8 where we see that at an AS level, the
7
Figure 7: From aAS, Country tuple standpoint, the All-to-
All paths are longer than the User study.
Figure 8: When considering the length of the path in
terms of number of ASes, the All-to-All paths are still
longer than the User study.
distribution of all-to-all measurements and user experience
measurements are relatively close to each other.
For the rest of the paper, we consider the datasets on the
following levels: a country level, a regional level, and case
studies of particularly interesting countries. Section 4 exam-
ines traffic exposure to different entities at a physical level:
what countries the packets actually land in. Section 5 then
examines traffic exposure to different countries from a legal
standpoint: where countries may have access to data that is
not physically traversing them but through legal jurisdiction
may have some access to the data.
4 PHYSICAL EXPOSURE
We want to quantify the amount of needless geographic
exposure from one entity to another. As a metric of normalcy,
we have defined the degree of normality (DoN) between
a particular source and destination as:
DoN =
total ”normal paths” seen
total paths seen
(2)
In this Section we consider only physical exposure of traf-
fic, in Section 5 we explore what occurs whenwe additionally
consider legal pressure nation states can exert. The global
physical DoN for the entire population of CAIDA or All-to-
All measured paths is 0.565. The global physical DoN for the
entire population of RIPE Atlas or User Experienced paths is
0.632, a roughly 11.9% increase.
We start our investigation of DoN by looking at the en-
tirety of the measurements from a few different angles. First,
we examine DoN given the length of the compressed AS,
country tuple path. Figure 9 shows that as the number of
hops in the path increases, the the DoN continually degrades.
Only paths with less than 5 hops have a DoN above the global
average for both all-to-all and user measurements, with DoN
dropping below 0.2 when there are 8 or more AS, country
hops in the paths. We also see that the longest path in the
RIPE Atlas measurements is 16 hops, though we see paths
of up to length 30 in the examined CAIDA traceroutes.
Beyond looking at just the raw number of AS, Country
tuple hops in the path, we investigated the DoN as the num-
ber of ASes involved grows. Figure 9b shows that similar
results as the tuple length DoN. As the path grows longer in
the number of ASes that carry the traffic, the less likely it is
to be normal. Paths that contain more than 3 ASes in them
have a DoN of below the global average for both datasets.
Lastly, Figure 9c gives us insight into the number of ge-
ographically illogical countries appearing on each wrong
path that was observed. We term any country that is not
geographically normal between sender and receiver, but ap-
pears in a transit capacity along the path a benefactor. We
see that the majority of paths expose data to one or two
benefactors. However, roughly a quarter of paths expose to
traffic to 3 or more benefactors. Keep in mind that this is
only one possible metric of path error severity. One might
also wish to consider “intangibles” related to the relationship
between, source, destination, and benefactor nations. For
instance, one country may want to avoid exposing internet
traffic to specific countries for political reasons. Another
potential metric for path error severity is distance from the
built convex hull.
We split the rest of our examination of DoN into two
levels: country and regional. Additionally, we split scenarios
for each of the two entities based on the role of the entity
in the path: the data source, the destination, or neither the
source nor destination (a transit entity).
4.1 Country DoN
DoN gives us the ability to examine how normal a population
of paths is. Here we examine the DoN at a country level.
Figures 10 and 11 shows CDFs of the DoN of countries given
their role in a path. Immediately, we see that the DoN for
each role in the path generally follows the same curve, but
is shifted left. Particularly interesting is that in both datasets
transit DoN is by far the worst, while source DoN is better
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(a) Tuple Path Length DoN (b) AS Path Length DoN (c) Severity of Irregular Paths
Figure 9: Examining the DoN through different lenses.
Figure 10: All-to-All Distribution of Physical DoNs
Figure 11: User Distribution of Physical DoNs
in every case. We see certain instances of a DoN of 0.00 or
1.00 in our RIPE measurements, these outliers are the result
of exceptionally small numbers of observed paths involving
the country in question.
While the global DoN for both measurements is above
0.500, we can see from the CDF that this average is biased
by a minority of countries, most notably the United States,
which appears both as the both the source and destination
of a large portion of its traffic. Only roughly a quarter of
countries have at or above the global DoN average.
Expanding our examination into country DoN, we look
into what countries serve as a transit provider for the most
paths in our dataset, and how often such paths are geograph-
ically logical. Tables 2 and 3 show the massive percentage of
traffic that the United States transits in both of our datasets.
The United States appears on more than half of paths as a
transit provider, yet belongs on less than half of them. Also
of particular interest is that Germany transits twice the per-
centage of traffic in the user measurements as it does in the
all-to-all measurement, but also its transit DoN is also dou-
bled when considering the user measurement. In fact, many
of the European countries that transit the most traffic have
significantly better transit DoNs in the user measurement
than in the all-to-all measurement, reflecting the ability of
CDNs to direct users to local copies of content, and as a side
benefit cut down on needless exposure.
While looking at the magnitude of traffic each nation tran-
sits and its transit DoN is important, we realize that transit
DoN can be inflated by paths that start and end in the same
country. For instance, the United States contains multiple
CAIDA monitors, and is the destination of many traceroutes,
inflating its transit DoN. Perhaps more interesting is con-
sidering how geographically normal these countries are in
paths that they are not the source or destination of. That is,
they are only a transit entity on the path. Tables 4 and 5 show
the vast difference when we focus on these paths. We now
see that Great Britain gets to see an incredible amount of
traffic that it is only a transit entity on, and only 6% of that is
normal. We also see that the United States gets to see much
of the traffic it does because it is either the source or destina-
tion of that traffic. We once again see that many transit DoNs
for countries are much higher in our user measurements.
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Country Ratio of All Paths Transited Transit DoN
US 0.537 0.480
GB 0.233 0.125
FR 0.112 0.141
DE 0.104 0.234
NL 0.091 0.265
ES 0.0791 0.077
CA 0.075 0.455
HK 0.053 0.053
ZA 0.039 0.087
SG 0.0388 0.130
Table 2: All-to-All Transit
Providers
Country Ratio of All Paths Transited Transit DoN
US 0.365 0.449
DE 0.234 0.493
GB 0.207 0.301
NL 0.164 0.438
FR 0.131 0.441
RU 0.117 0.565
SE 0.069 0.274
CA 0.065 0.335
ES 0.062 0.046
HK 0.043 0.167
Table 3: User Transit Providers
Country Transit Only / Total Paths Transit Only DoN
GB 0.204 0.064
US 0.136 0.096
FR 0.092 0.092
DE 0.087 0.169
NL 0.069 0.160
ES 0.063 0.042
HK 0.050 0.034
JP 0.024 0.050
KE 0.023 0.101
CA 0.022 0.021
Table 4: All-to-All Transit Only
Country Transit Only / Total Paths Transit Only DoN
GB 0.179 0.244
DE 0.120 0.323
US 0.090 0.083
NL 0.079 0.279
FR 0.060 0.310
ES 0.059 0.029
SE 0.054 0.254
CA 0.042 0.065
NO 0.021 0.382
HK 0.020 0.002
Table 5: User Transit Only
Country # Paths Benefited From
GB 457,562,290
US 276,827,580
FR 157,935,629
DE 150,325,940
NL 136,078,286
ES 134,843,093
HK 117,614,775
CA 48,765,568
JP 47,694,457
KE 39,932,587
Table 6: Top All-to-All Benefactors
Country # Paths Benefited From
GB 9,288
US 6,488
ES 4,242
DE 3,793
NL 3,580
CA 2,915
SE 2,615
FR 2,204
HK 1,591
JP 1,156
Table 7: Top User Benefactors
In Figure 9 we introduced the term ’benefactor’ of a non-
normal path. Tables 7 and 6 show the countries that benefit
the most from each set of paths examined. Immediately we
see the extraordinary amount of paths that Great Britain and
the United States see that they geographically should not.
Great Britain is not only the top country in both measure-
ments, but in the all-to-all measurement, Great Britain sees 3
times as many irregular paths as the 3rd most country. This
is due in part to Great Britain’s "piggybacking" off of bad
paths bound for the United States, in addition to any illogical
paths which traverse Great Britain by itself. Great Britain
further benefits from paths originating from countries such
as Spain and France "back tracking" to Great Britain before
crossing the Atlantic Ocean.
While these countries benefit from a large number of paths,
we see that they do not necessarily do a bad job of transit-
ing all of their traffic. Magnitude is an issue with exposing
traffic, but it is also valuable to examine the ratio of the num-
ber of paths a nation benefits from to the total amount of
traffic the nation transits. Figures 12 and 13 visualize this
ratio. We see that many of the top 10 countries from Ta-
bles 7 and 7 are not as prominent when considering this
ratio. Instead, we see that for certain nations who appear as
transit providers, in nearly all instances have no geographic
business being on the path. In other words the vast majority
of their transit traffic is a result of geographically illogical
routes. One interesting point is that we see much of Africa
benefits from large fractions of the traffic they transit in our
all-to-all measurements but are virtually non-existent in the
user measurements, a result of minimal CDN infrastructure
appearing in the African continent.
4.2 Regional DoN
Next, we examine DoN at a regional level, where we see in
Tables 8 and 9 that certain regions have a better degree of
normality when the path is to them rather than from them.
For instance, the Americas (North, South, and Central) have
a higher than average DoN when the path ends or starts
there, but a much lower DoN when they are found transiting
data. Part of this could be explained by the smaller number of
countries in the Americas, particularly North America.When
having more adjacent countries, such as in Europe, there are
more choices of countries to route through, and could natu-
rally bring down the DoN for the region. Furthermore, we
see that Africa’s DoN is completely reversed when referenc-
ing both measurements. In the all-to-all measurement we
see that they have a poor DoN when they are the source
or transit entity on a path, while in the user measurements
they do a much better job, but have poor destination DoN.
Finally, we see that in Europe, transit DoN rises dramatically
in our user measurements, perhaps indicating that they are
a poor transit provider of traffic that is destined outside the
region, but have high levels of content localization in for
destinations the Region.
Finally, we wish to examine the DoN of each region on
a region to region basis. This is particularly important be-
cause it shows how normal the routing infrastructure is at a
coarser level. Tables 10 and 11 show that when staying inside
a region, every region except Asia has an above average DoN.
We also see in Table 10 that the DoN from one region to an-
other is highly symmetrical: the DoN traversing from region
1 to region 2 is typically close to the DoN when traversing
from region 2 to region 1. We see somewhat less symmetry
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Figure 12: Geographic Distribution of the All-to-All
(CAIDA) Benefactor/Transit Ratio
Figure 13: Geographic Distribution of the User (RIPE)
Benefactor/Transit Ratio
Region Source DoN Transit DoN Destination DoN
Americas 0.755 0.489 0.671
Europe 0.455 0.228 0.521
Asia 0.259 0.194 0.404
Oceania 0.462 0.236 0.282
Africa 0.154 0.116 0.347
Table 8: All-to-All Regional DoN
Region Source DoN Transit DoN Destination DoN
Americas 0.739 0.454 0.719
Europe 0.616 0.482 0.548
Asia 0.386 0.178 0.247
Oceania 0.565 0.064 0.570
Africa 0.373 0.485 0.185
Table 9: User Region DoN
in DoN in the user experience dataset. Of particular note,
Table 11 reveals an incredibly high DoN from every region
to the Americas.
From \To Africa Americas Asia Europe Oceania
Africa 0.812 0.023 0.097 0.249 0.0003
Americas 0.051 0.904 0.583 0.597 0.209
Asia 0.017 0.237 0.376 0.176 0.201
Europe 0.147 0.454 0.177 0.651 0.024
Oceania 0.017 0.572 0.384 0.044 0.884
Table 10: All-to-All Transit To/ From
From \To Africa Americas Asia Europe Oceania
Africa 1.000 0.535 0.050 0.186 0.000
Americas 0.176 0.793 0.350 0.623 0.645
Asia 0.000 0.484 0.412 0.160 0.188
Europe 0.114 0.702 0.151 0.568 0.472
Oceania 0.000 0.765 0.531 0.096 0.833
Table 11: User Transit To/ From
5 LEGAL EXPOSURE
While looking at paths from a purely physical standpoint
is important, we also want to consider how geographically
normal a path is when additionally considering countries
that can exert legal control over an AS transiting traffic. This
is particularly important because many ASes are legally reg-
istered in one country while having physical infrastructure
in another. For example, 18 of our CAIDA monitors are phys-
ically located in a country different than the one their ASN is
legally registered in. To measure the legal exposure of a path,
we take every physical AS, country tuple path we have and
map the AS back to the country it was registered in. If we
only consider legal exposure, the global DoN for the all-to-all
measurement is 0.712 and the user measurement is 0.675.
Figures 14 and 15 show the legal DoN of the countries we
have measurements for. We see mostly the same trends here
that we did in Figures 10 and 11, which is that the DoN of all
three curves is mostly the same, but shifted. One difference,
however, is in the RIPE legal DoN. Here we see higher transit
DoNs than destination DoNs. Again we notice the trend that
a small number of very well off nation states drive the overall
average due to their involvement with more path. In fact,
80% of nations have a DoN when involved in a path below
the average legal DoN.
We also examine the benefactors of non-normal legal paths
in Tables 12 and 13. Here we see Bulgaria, which was not
in the top 10 benefactors for either measurement in terms
of physical benefactors, is 1st and 2nd in our legal measure-
ments of the all-to-all topology and user-experience, respec-
tively. This is an exceptionally interesting case since few
of the involved paths physically transit Bulgaria, but the
Bulgarian government could place pressure on companies
corporately headquartered there to gain access to the traffic.
Furthermore, we see that the United States is a benefactor
in over 4 times as many paths as anyone else in our all-to-all
measurements. This may be due to the fact that many large
ASes that are legally registered in the United States have
physical infrastructure in multiple countries.
Ultimately, the path entities that have influence over the
path that any data takes are both the physical and legal enti-
ties that the traffic is exposed to. To examine the normality
of paths when considering this, we have determined the
normality of paths based on the union of the physical and
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Figure 14: All-to-All Distribution of Le-
gal Country DoNs
Figure 15: User Distribution of Legal
Country DoNs
Figure 16: AddedCountrieswhenUnion-
ing Legal and Physical Transit Coun-
tries
Country # Paths Benefited From
US 316,837,638
BG 78,707,435
DE 69,875,057
HK 58,841,304
GB 55,482,445
ZA 46,602,480
AT 28,613,961
ES 27,396,710
NL 26,234,852
IL 21,173,866
Table 12: All-to-All Legal Benefactors
Country # Paths Benefited From
BG 113,56
US 6,744
GB 2,888
DE 2,036
NL 1,291
UA 1,089
RU 1,059
DK 7,45
NO 6,95
ES 4,58
Table 13: User Legal Benefactors
All-to-All User
Physical 0.565 0.632
Legal 0.712 0.674
Union 0.519 0.500
Table 14: Summary of the global DoN
legal countries transited. We term this DoN union DoN and
it accurately reflects all of the entities that could act as path
based adversaries on a given path. To compute this DoN we
took the physical source and destination of a path and the
union of both the legal and physical transit entities. Table 14
shows the drop in DoN across both measurements when we
compute this union. It is important to note that the union
DoN can only be lower than the physical DoN as we can
only add countries to the set when computing the union
of transit entities. We see a more than 20% drop in normal-
ity for our user-experience data set when we consider the
union of physical and legal exposure, as well as an 8% drop
in normality in our all-to-all measurement.
Figure 16 gives us insight into the amount of extra coun-
tries that a path gets exposed to when we compute the union
of the physical and legal transit entities. Here we see that in
most instances in which the union results in added exposure,
only a single nation state is added.
6 RELATEDWORK
While our work is the first comprehensive study of which
nation states inordinately benefit from choices made by the
Internet’s routing infrastructure, several other works have
examined portions of the problem space. Karlin et. al. [23]
was one of the first to explore this phenomena. In their work
they utilized both traceroutes and inference based on infor-
mation from BGP routing tables gathered for public mirrors
to generate centrality of measures of nation states on the
Internet. Our work builds on their techniques in order to
explore if the centrality of certain nation states is simply the
result of the number of hosts residing in those countries, if
it results from providing a necessary physical connection
between a send and receiver, or if, as we often saw, it is
a physically unnecessary phenomena. Additionally, Karlin
et. al. focused only on an "all-to-all" Internet measurement,
rather than exploring the subset of paths used to distribute
the majority of content.
Obar and Clement [27] were the first to explore needless
exposure of traffic to unnecessary nation states. Specifically
they focused on paths taken from sources inside of Canada
to destinations inside of Canada, but exited Canada tem-
porarily to transit infrastructure in the United States. This
"boomeranging" behavior they argued was a violation of
the sovereignty of Canadian Internet traffic. Shah and Pa-
padopoulos [33] attempted to expand the measurement of
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this phenomena to all nations, basing their measurements
again on observations of the global routing tables. Our work
utilizes our novel convex hull based definition of geographi-
cally normal to more broadly explore this violation of sover-
eignty, expanding it to consider traffic transiting between
two different countries in addition to traffic starting and
ending inside the same nation.
The most similar to our work is Edmundson et. al. [16],
which attempted to refine Shah and Papadopoulos’s measure-
ments of paths starting and ending inside the same nation
transiting outside that nation, which they termed "trombon-
ing". Like our work, Edmundson et. al. utilized traceroutes
rather than inferences based on routing tables, and explored
the concept of a "typical user" model. However, Edmund-
son et. al. focused their measurements on five countries:
Brazil, Netherlands, Kenya, India, and the United States. Our
measurements greatly expand on this; for the user model
explored 30 and 64 countries as sources and destinations
respectively, and our all-to-all model had 52 source and 240
destination nations. Additionally, their work utilized curl in
order to build their model of which hosts are contacted dur-
ing the loading of web content, a methodology that our prior
work has found underestimates the number of resources
contacted by a factor of roughly 20, and often incorrectly
identifies the location of the server supplying the bulk of
the content. Like similar work Edmundson et. al. utilize a
focused definition of an illogical path, centered only on trom-
boning, while we apply our convex hull technique to explore
geographically illogical paths more broadly. Lastly, given
that their work pre-dated events such as the CLOUD act, Ed-
mundson et. al. do not explore legal exposure in their work;
given recent events we include this analysis.
Work exploring the degree to which other nation states
can impact the Internet connectivity of their citizens or other
nations as a result of the AS level Internet topology also ex-
ists. One of the most well known of these works is Roberts
et. al. [30], where the authors explored how many ASes were
physically located inside each country, and how many other
nation states those ASes provided that country a direct con-
nection to. More recently, Wahlisch et. al. [34] explores this
concept in detail for traffic sources or destinations specifi-
cally in the nation of Germany. Both of these works only
consider what ASes have infrastructure inside or directly
connected to the given nation states, and do not consider
the actual paths traffic takes during transit and what nation
states those paths traverse.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have examined the extent to which the
Internet’s routing infrastructure needlessly exposes network
traffic to different nations. In summary, our contributions
are as follows:
• We developed a unique infrastructure for doing so by
defining what a "normal" geographic path is between
two countries through the use of convex hulls.
• We quantified the amount of normal and irregular
traffic between two entities through the lense of the
path based degree of normality (DoN). We measure
the exposure of both the entire geographic topology
of the Internet and the subset of the topology that a
user generally interacts with and examined over 2.5
billion paths.
• We reveal that 44% of paths concerning the entire
geographic topology and 33% of paths concerning
the user experienced topology unnecessarily expose
network traffic to at least one nation state, often
more.
• We examined the benefitting nations and regions of
geographically illogical paths.
• We explored the legal countries each measured path
traverses to determine the countries with legal ju-
risdiction over the traversed ASes in all 2.5 billion
paths. When considering both the physical and legal
countries each path crosses, over 49% of paths in
both datasets expose traffic to at least one nation
unnecessarily.
• Overall, we found the global DoN for the physi-
cal topology to be 0.565 (entire topology) and 0.632
(user), and the legal to be 0.712 (entire) and 0.674
(user). The combined union of the two shows the en-
tire Internet with a 0.519 DoN and user experienced
paths to be 0.500. Notably, the Internet averages to
be geographically logical in only slightly more than
half of all countries and regions.
Future Work:We plan to expand our measurements to ex-
amine countries which see temporary, but marked, changes
in their DoN.We will then attempt to establish the root cause
of such changes. Ideally, we could measure these changes in
real-time via measurement infrastructures built into CAIDA
systems such as Ark or RIPE Atlas. We are also interested in
examining if adversarial actions could result in a temporarily
reduced DoN for nations, or if particular nations could inor-
dinately benefit from adversarial reductions in DoN. Lastly,
we wish to examine if nations can adjust their routing poli-
cies in an effort to increase their DoN, effectively reducing
their exposure to nation state level path adversaries.
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